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THE WEBER/PUTZ ‘PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE’: 
DETERMINING SUBSEQUENT PERFORMANCE ANEW?
Thomas Hoffmann*
Summary: Although the European Court of Justice rendered its We-
ber/Putz judgment as long ago as three years, the turmoil since then 
in both academia and practice has not abated. Indeed, the signifi-
cance of the ‘proportionality principle’ for European contract law can 
hardly be overestimated, as the ECJ basically established by this 
judgment, with or without intent, a doctrine of general strict liability in 
contract law, which so far has only existed in but a few European le-
gal systems beyond common law. This paper compares the reception 
of the Weber/Putz decision in a major Western European legal system 
(Germany) with the approach of a minor Central European legal sys-
tem (Estonia), also taking into account the judgment’s impact on the 
future development of European contract law.
1. Introduction
The ‘proportionality principle’, as it was developed on 16 June 2011 
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the interpretation of Article 3 
of Directive 1999/44 (hereinafter: the Directive)1 in its joint decisions ECJ 
C‑65/09 and C‑87/09 (Weber/Putz),2 has caused considerable turmoil in 
jurisprudence as well as in legal practice.3 The judgment’s extensive im‑
pact derives not only from the central function of the ‘Consumer‑Goods‑
Directive’ for the harmonisation of European contract law,4 but also from 
the commonness of the issue featured in the case in daily contract prac‑
*  Thomas Hoffmann, Dr iur, LLM, DAAD Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, Tartu Univer‑
sity, Estonia.
1 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 
on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] OJ 
L171/12.
2 Joined Cases C‑65/09 and C‑78/09 Gebr Weber GmbH v Jürgen Wittmer and Ingrid Putz 
v Medianess Electronics GmbH, Judgment of the Court of Justice (First Chamber) of 16 
June 2011.
3 See eg K Purnhagen, ‚Zur Auslegung der Nacherfüllungsverpflichtung – Ein Paukensch‑
lag aus Luxemburg’ (2011) EuZW, 626; S Lorenz, ‘Ein- und Ausbauverpflichtung des Ver‑
käufers bei der kaufrechtlichen Nacherfüllung‘ (2011) NJW, 2241.
4 See eg A Johnston, ‘Spillovers from EU Law into National Law: (Un)intended Con‑
sequences for Private Law Relationships’ in D Leczykiewiecz and S Weatherill (eds), The 
Involvelment of EU Law in Private Law Relationships (Hart Publishing 2013); A Johnston 
and H Unberath, ‘Joined Cases C‑65/09 and C‑78/09’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 793.
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tice. Just recently,5 the German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) endeavoured a 
second time6 to implement the reasoning of Weber/Putz into the German 
framework of law of obligations, and other Member States at present face 
similar challenges.
After elucidating the facts of the cases and their legal background, 
this paper dis cusses the approach taken by the ECJ and draws conclu‑
sions for the implementation of the ECJ’s reasoning in European con‑
tract law.
2. Facts of the case
The ECJ judgment is a preliminary ruling according to Article 234 
TFEU sought by the BGH on 14 January 2009 according to Article 267 
TFEU by the First Instance Lower Court (Amtsgericht) Schorndorf on 25 
February 2009.7 In both cases, the purchasers had bought goods (floor 
tiles and a dishwasher respectively) which were delivered and installed 
in their homes before they turned out to be defective. In both cases, the 
seller merely owed the delivery of the goods, and the removal of the defec‑
tive goods and the re‑installation of new goods were considerably more 
expensive than the value of the tiles and the dishwasher themselves. 
As repair in both cases was not possible, neither of the sellers ob‑
jected to their duty to deliver anew and free of charge. However, in the 
cases at hand, the buyers claimed additional reimbursement of the costs 
of removal and reinstallation (Weber) and the complete restitution of the 
contractual price after rescis sion (Putz) from the sellers.
3. Legal background
Against this background, the BGH sought a preliminary ruling of the 
question whether
1. it is against the Directive if national law states that the seller 
may refuse the demanded form of subsequent performance (here 
replacement) if this form of performance causes costs which are 
disproportionate to the value of the con tract‑conform good and, if 
this approach is indeed against the Directive, whether
5 17 October 2012, VII ZR 226/11, commented on by M Jaensch, ‘Der Umfang der kauf‑
rechtlichen Nacherfüllung‘ (2012) NJW, 1025. 
6 A first decision interpreting the reasoning of Weber/Putz was issued on 21 December 
2012, VRR ZR 07/08.
7 Case Gebrüder Weber GmbH v Jürgen Wittmer, Bundesgerichtshof (the German Supreme 
Court) case number  C‑65/09 and Ingrid Putz v Medianess Electronics GmbH, Amtsgericht 
Schorndorf (Schorndrof County Court) case number C‑87/09.
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2.  the seller will be obliged to bear the costs of removal of the defec‑
tive good, if the good was installed according to its contractual 
purposes.
3.1 Question 1
The ‘national law’ the BGH refers to in its first question is section 
439 III BGB8 – regulating cure under German law9 – which states that
Without prejudice to section 275 (2) and (3), the seller may re‑
fuse to provide the kind of cure chosen by the buyer, if this cure 
is possible only at disproportionate expense. In this connection, 
account must be taken in particular, without limitation, of the 
value of the thing when free of defects (…).
Section 439 BGB, drafted in the course of the major reform of the 
German law of obligations in 2002 as an implementation of Article 3 of 
the Directive, is doctrinally seen as a ‘modification of the original claim 
for performance’.10 The BGH had traditionally taken this origin into ac‑
count, focusing merely on the extent of the original claim – which in these 
cases according to the contract did not include installation, waiving all 
eventual fur ther claims for removal or installation.11 
Therefore, in the first question at hand, the BGH did not raise the 
issue of an eventual duty for removal/reinstallation at all, but merely 
intended to determine where the calculation of proportionality should be 
attached. In this point, section 439 paragraph III BGB does not accord to 
Article 3 paragraph III of the Directive, which states:
A remedy shall be deemed to be disproportionate if it imposes 
costs on the seller which, in comparison with the alternative 
remedy, are unrea sonable (…).
In other words, should the seller also be entitled to refuse the de‑
manded kind of subsequent performance due to disproportionate costs, 
taking into account the value of the thing when free of defects (absolute 
proportionality, as fore seen by the BGB), or may he do so also if these 
8 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, ie the German Civil Code in the version promulgated on 2 
January 2002 (Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] I page 42, 2909; 2003 I page 738), 
last amended by Article 1 of the statute of 27 July 2011 (Federal Law Gazette I, 1600).
9 Defining the scope of cure according to sec 439 BGB has probably been ‘one of the most 
extensively discussed topics in German private law in recent years’ (Johnston and Unberath 
(n 4) 795, footnote 9).
10 S Augenhofer, C Appenzeller and V Holm, ‚Nacherfüllungsort und Aus- und Einbaukos‑
ten’ (2011) JuS, 681. 
11 BGH, decisions of 15 July 2008 (NJW 2008 2837) and of 13 April 2013 (NJW 2011, 
2278), both commented on by Faust, JuS 2008, 933‑936 and JuS 2011, 744‑748.
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costs are disproportionate when compared just to other forms of rem‑
edies (relative proportionality, Article 3 III of the Directive)? 
Generally, section 439 paragraph III BGB has been doctrinally rath‑
er well settled in German law. According to the government’s statement12 
on the draft of section 439 paragraph III BGB, the provi sion was intended 
as a specification or ‘light version’ of economic impossibility regulated in 
section 275 paragraph II BGB, which just required weaker criteria to be 
applied. Based on this approach, German legal literature13 distributed a 
clear doctrinal location to section 439, supposing that both section 275 
paragraph II BGB and section 439 paragraph III BGB are ‘structurally 
comparable’.14 
However, returning to the Directive, section 349 paragraph III BGB 
had already been claimed for quite some time to be incompatible by legal 
literature,15 mainly based on the structural argument, as the Directive 
does not provides a right of refusal to the seller because of absolute lack 
of proportionality, but only due to impos sibility.16 
3.2 Question 2
At first sight, the German approach appears to be rather complex: 
under German law, costs for removal/installation, as both elements are 
not part of the original obligations of a sales contract, can generally only 
be claimed as dam age apart from performance according to section 280 
paragraph I, section 437 variant number 3 BGB. But as liability under 
section 280 paragraph I BGB requires fault, the seller may only be liable 
if he with intent or negligence knew or ought to have known about the 
mistake – which gen erally will not be the case, as the defect is usually 
caused by the producer, and there is no seller’s duty to examine the 
goods before sale.17
There is therefore no claim according to section 280 paragraph I in 
conjunction with section 437 no 3 BGB, but the buyer may still eventu‑
ally claim costs as damage resulting from denied performance (section 
281 paragraph II variant number 1 and/or section 323 paragraph II vari‑
ant number 1 BGB) (ie based on rescission), if removal/installation are 
12 Bundestags-Drucksache 17/6040, 232.
13 Eg H-P Westermann in MünchKomm-BGB, 5 Aufl (2008), sec 439 para 13.
14 F Faust, Ersatz der Ausbaukosten bei der Ersatzlieferung; absolute Unverhältnismäßigkeit 
der Nacherfüllung, JuS 2009, 472.
15 F Faust in Bamberger/Roth (commentary to BGB), BeckOK-BGB, Ed 20 (1 February 
2007) § 439 para 53ff.
16 See eg M Jaensch, ‚Die Störung der Nacherfüllung im Kaufrecht‘, Jura 2005, 653, para 
57.
17 S Lorenz, ‘Die Reichweite der kaufrechtlichen Nacherfüllungspflicht durch Neulieferung‘ 
(2009) NJW, 1633.
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owed within subsequence performance, or, in other words, if they are 
subject to cure according to section 439 BGB. In fact, it boils down again 
to the question of how the scope of the seller’s obligation to cure a defect 
of goods should be determined.
The relationship set up by the BGH between the two questions is at 
first sight not entirely clear. Indeed, the question of whether there is at 
all a duty to remove/re‑install arises prior to issues of the subsequent 
proportionality of such duties. In fact, it has been assumed that the BGH, 
which had waived any right at least for re‑installation in its Parkettstäbe 
decision18 of 15 July 2008, did not intend to raise the issue again so soon 
after having put an (interim) end to a rather contro versial discussion19 
in Germany. In Parkettstäbe, it deviated from its former rea soning devel‑
oped in the Dachziegel decision20 (which granted at least the right to the 
removal of the defective goods) in a doctrinally rather controversial way, 
as it stipulated the seller’s duty to remove in cases of a ‘special interest’ 
of the buyer therein.21 Taking these matters into account, Amtsgericht 
Schorndorf doubted the compatibility of the German juridical practice 
and referred the question to the ECJ – shortly after the BGH itself had 
extended22 its reference to the ECJ by question No. 2. 
The Directive itself does not provide clear instructions to settle these 
alleged claims; it states in Article 3 paragraphs 2 and 3 as follows:
2) In the case of a lack of conformity, the consumer shall be en‑
titled to have the goods brought into conformity free of charge 
by repair or replacement, in accordance with paragraph 3, 
or to have an appropriate reduction made in the price or the 
contract rescinded with regard to those goods, in accordance 
with paragraphs 5 and 6.
3) In the first place, the consumer may require the seller to re‑
pair the goods or he may require the seller to replace them, 
in either case free of charge, unless this is impossible or dis‑
proportionate.
 A remedy shall be deemed to be disproportionate if it imposes 
costs on the seller which, in comparison with the alternative 
remedy, are unreasonable, taking into account:
 -  the value the goods would have if there were no lack of   
 conformity,
 -  the significance of the lack of conformity, and
 ‑  whether the alternative remedy could be completed with  
 out significant incon venience to the consumer.
18 BGHZ 177, 224 para 15; NJW 2008, 2837.
19 On the whole issue, see eg S Lorenz (n 17) 1633.
20 BGHZ 87, 104, reported in NJW 1983, 1479.
21 See critical evaluation and further links at F Faust (n 14) 471.
22 BGH, decision of 14 January 2009, JZ 2009, 310. 
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 Any repair or replacement shall be completed within a rea‑
sonable time and without any significant inconvenience to 
the consumer, taking account of the nature of the goods and 
the purpose for which the consumer required the goods.
4. The reasoning of the ECJ
4.1 Opinion of Advocate General Mazák 
The approach taken by Advocate General Mazák tried to balance 
the interests of both parties, initially stating that consumer law was not 
so simple that categorically granting extensive consumer rights would 
automatically lead to fair (and consumer‑friendly) results.23 Concerning 
the eventual duty to remove/install, he concluded, since a literal inter‑
pretation of ‘replacement’ did not resolve the matter, that a claim based 
on performance could not include the duty to provide more than it was 
‘originally owed under the contract’, ie the transfer of property in the sold 
good. Any further claim aiming at the restitution of the buyer’s general 
situation prior to defective delivery would not correspond with the buyer’s 
interest in proper performance, but rather refer to his integrity interests 
and should therefore be classified as damages rather than (subsequent) 
performance.24 Damages, however, were usually granted only upon fur‑
ther requirements as remoteness, causation or fault – criteria which were 
not provided by the Directive. Therefore, neither removal nor installation 
was included in the seller’s duties according to the Directive.
Concerning proportionality, Mazák agreed with prior German juris‑
diction that the seller may also refuse the demanded kind of performance 
due to absolute disproportionality, as otherwise the seller may face unac‑
ceptable cases of hardship if the costs of subsequent performance con‑
siderably exceed the value of the delivered good.25
4.2 The ECJ’s decision
The ECJ, however, did not follow Mazák’s opinion in either point, 
stipulating with regard to question 2 that the Directive imposed an obli‑
gation on the seller to remove the defective good and install the new good 
at his own expense, even if (as is usually the case) the purchase contract 
did not include any installation duties, reasoning frankly that the re‑
placement of non‑conforming goods by the buyer would lead to additional 
expenses for the buyer, which would contradict the Directive in so far as 
the remedy for the buyer must be ‘free of charge’ (Article 3 paragraph 2). 
23 Case C‑65/09 (Weber), Opinion of AG Mazák, para 30.
24 Case C‑87/09 (Putz), Opinion of AG Mazák, paras 56‑57.
25 Case C‑65/09 (Weber), Opinion of AG Mazák, para 85.
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The court admits that neither removal nor installation was mentioned in 
paragraph 4, which just refers to costs of ‘postage, labour and materi‑
als’, but argues, as pointed out in the Quelle decision,26 that ‘this list is 
illustrative, not exhaustive’.27 Furthermore, a wide interpretation would 
be necessary to meet the Directive’s objective of ‘ensuring a high level of 
consumer protection’. The seller would be protected by ‘prescription and 
the possibility of redress against the producer’.28 The central legal issue 
also raised by Mazák – the differentiation between damage due to denied 
subsequent performance and (fault‑based) damages apart from perfor‑
mance – was omitted completely by the ECJ.29
Concerning proportionality, the court first differentiated between Ar‑
ticle 3 paragraph 3 sentences 1 and 2: while sentence 1 (‘the consumer 
may require the seller to repair the goods (…) unless this is impossible or 
disproportionate’) would also include absolute proportionality, sentence 
2 (‘A remedy shall be deemed to be disproportionate if it imposes costs on 
the seller which, in comparison with the alternative remedy, are unrea‑
sonable’) was restricted to relative proportionality, as the wording directly 
refers to ‘other remedies’. Anyhow, sentence 3 of the same paragraph 
would ‘nevertheless allow effective protection of the legitimate financial 
interests of the seller’30 by granting him the right to ‘reduce – ie not to 
refuse – the reimbursement ‘to an amount proportionate to the value the 
goods would have if there were no lack of conformity and the significance 
of the lack of conformity (…)’,31 if the reimbursement is not ‘rendered de‑
void of substance’.32 In other words, the court first decided explicitly that 
absolute proportionality cannot be seen as defence, ie that a respective 
national regulation (such as section 439 paragraph III sentence 3 BGB) is 
not compatible, but that on the other hand the seller’s legitimate financial 
interests may under certain conditions deserve protection anyway, which 
comes in fact very close to the concept of absolute proportionality.33 
This reasoning implies the following: at first, the court restricts the 
buyer’s claim to reimbursement, implying that the buyer has merely a 
right to recover cure costs, instead of being entitled to demand the dealer 
to effect the cure himself, an approach which contradicts, for example, 
German law, where (subsequent) performance generally has priority. A 
26 Case C‑404/06 [2008] para 31.
27 Joined Cases C‑65/09 and C‑87/09 [2011] para 50.
28 ibid para 58.
29 Lorenz (n 3) 2243.
30 Joined Cases C‑65/09 and C‑87/09 [2011] para 73.
31 ibid para 74.
32 ibid para 76.
33 According to Johnston and Unberath (n 4), the court’s reasoning is ‘nothing short of per‑
plexing’ 804; see also C Faust, ‘Kaufrecht: Reichweite des Anspruchs auf Ersatzlieferung’ 
(2011) Jus, 744.
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striking point as well is that in this context the ECJ introduces crite‑
ria determined by quantity, not quality: the seller is not granted a de‑
fence, which would directly protect him from disproportionate claims to 
remove/install, but he is, independently of the payment duty claimed 
by the buyer, granted a separate right to proportionally limit this sub‑
sequent duty to cover expenses for removal/installation which arose for 
the buyer.
Besides, the limitation stipulated by the court does not apply for the 
replacement itself; this right is left ‘intact’: in other words, for the repair 
of a defective good, merely relative proportionality will be applied. 
Finally, the most essential point is that the ECJ deviated from the ex‑
plicit principle of the Directive to abstain from damage regulation, which 
was established mainly due to divergent national approaches: stating 
that the buyer is entitled to removal and installation by the seller himself 
(respective of the costs of removal and installation performed through 
a competitor if the buyer no longer wants this to be performed by the 
seller), the court introduced in fact a general strict liability for damages 
resulting from non‑performance.34 Anyhow, in spite of the central signifi‑
cance of this statement, the respective criteria introduced by the court 
are more than vague; a duty to pay damages is based on conditions im‑
plying terms such as ‘by their nature’, or even ‘good faith’. This approach 
is a considerable challenge to the system of defences, not only those used 
in most European private law systems, but also within the Directive.35
5 The impact of the decision on national and European law
Legal practice and legislation will have to decide how the judgment 
can be implemented in today’s European private laws without raising 
major conflicts with existing structures. Conflicts may arise especially 
concerning the propor tionality principle, which is alien to the text of the 
Directive itself – a fact which prevented European private law systems 
from being prepared for this decision by means of prior Directive imple‑
mentation. 
5.1 Germany
The BGH, for instance, had to settle this issue just a few months 
after36 the ECJ’s decision, when it took the reasoning in Weber/Putz into 
34 Lorenz (n 3) 2243.
35 Johnston and Unberath (n 4) 802.
36 Bundesgerichtshof, Decision of 21 December 2011, case number VIII ZR 70/08, repor‑
ted in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2012, 1073.
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account as follows:37 after stating that generally section 439 paragraph III 
sentence 3 BGB at present is not compatible with the Directive, it conced‑
ed that the seller nevertheless deserved protection – an attitude explicitly 
not required in the given situation by the ECJ, which remarks that Article 
3 merely ‘enables account to be taken of [the] economic considerations’ of 
the seller.38 The exact doctrinal approach on how this protection should 
be effected remains unclear; the BGH refers generally to section 440 par‑
agraph I BGB,39 which grants the buyer the right to rescind from the 
contract without granting an additional period of performance if the (sub‑
sequent) performance ‘cannot reasonably be expected of him’. It must be 
admitted that section 440 BGB first of all is a defence to the seller, which 
prompted further explanation by the BGH: the seller would, anyhow, not 
be entitled to refuse performance unless his (disproportionate) costs were 
(partly) compensated, but the duty to perform – ie also to remove/install 
– would prevail, though compensated by an (independent) right to claim 
partial reimbursement of the costs of removal/installation. The BGH ap‑
proached the ECJ’s attitude at least indirectly by referring to removal/
installation as part of ‘performance’. The rather complex reasoning of 
the latter part is owed to the intention to keep the decision compatible 
with the ECJ’s wording in paragraph 76, where it stated that ‘the pos‑
sibility of making such a reduction’ must not ‘result in the consumer’s 
right to reimbursement of those costs being effec tively rendered devoid of 
substance’, which a comprehensive defence in the seller’s favour would 
certainly lead to. 
The BGH, in a last step, also determined the amount of reimburse‑
ment (removing and/or installing) the seller may claim from the buyer, 
setting 50% of the value of the goods without defects, which in the case 
at hand amounted to EUR 600 (at overall removal costs of EUR 5,830.57), 
admitting that the determination of the general calculation modes in this 
context were to be devel oped by the legislator.
5.2 Estonia
Estonia’s Supreme Court has not yet decided a respective case af‑
ter the decision in Weber/Putz, but taking into account the structure 
of section 222 of VÕS,40 a similar case before Estonian courts would 
face considerably less collisions than under German law. A comparison 
37 See also S Leible and M Müller, ‘Nacherfüllung durch Lieferung einer mangelfreien Sa‑
che erfasst Ausbau und Abtransport der mangelhaften Kaufsache‘ (2012) LMK, 330321.
38 Joined Cases C‑65/09 and C‑87/09 [2011] para 75.
39 Bundesgerichtshof, Decision of 21 December 2011, VIII ZR 70/08, reported in Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 2012, 1073, para 48.
40 Võlaõigusseadus, the Estonian Law of Obligation Act – RT I 2001, 81, 487 (in Estonian). 
An English version is available at <www.just.ee/23295> accessed 29 October 2013. 
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of the legally relevant passage, stating that the purchaser may demand 
remedies 
(…) if this is possible and does not cause the seller unreasonable 
costs or unreasonable inconvenience compared to the use of oth‑
er legal remedies considering, inter alia, the value of the thing, 
the significance of the lack of conformity and the opportunity for 
the purchaser to acquire a thing which conforms to the contract 
from elsewhere without incon venience (…)
with Article 3 paragraph III sentence 2 of the Directive essentially 
provides for parallels of the respective determination of proportionality. 
Section 222 VÕS generally follows the principle of relative proportional‑
ity, providing – just like the Directive – in its second clause exemplary 
ways of determining proportionality. 
With regards to the ECJ’s decision in Weber/Putz, Estonia’s Obliga‑
tions Act is compatible with the Directive. The exact determination of 
the respective seller’s reimbursement shares, however, will have to be 
achieved on a case‑by‑case basis as well.
5.3 The European dimension
From a general European perspective, the detailed interpretation of 
a directive by the court – and, concerning the Directive’s intention to ab‑
stain from the regulation of damages, even contradicting one of its objec‑
tives – raises the question of whether under such procedures a regulation 
would not provide more legal certainty than a directive, and would there‑
fore be the preferable instrument. The decision also touches on European 
consumer law, as many Member States – among them Germany – have 
implemented the Directive in their general law of obligations, being ap‑
plicable for B2C and B2B rela tionships as well. In fact, the decision has 
revived initiatives in Germany to re‑separate parts of directive‑based law 
again and restrict it to consumers.41 In German legal literature, the ques‑
tion on how far the respective provisions can be teleologically reduced to 
consumers, as the motivation of the ECJ was ex plicitly consumer pro‑
tection, has been raised numerous times since 2011;42 the interest in 
a uniform private law43 is juxtaposed to the assumed intent of the na‑
tional legislator, who – in the situation of section 439 BGB – did not 
classify removal and installation as part of performance, and is therefore 
41 Johnston and Unberath (n 4) 806.
42 A Weiss, ‚Gespalten oder einheitlich? Über die rechtliche Behandlung so genannter Hyb‑
ridnormen in nationalen Rechtsordnungen’ (2012) EuZW, 733‑737.
43 Faust (n 33) 748; see also BGH (‘Heininger‑Decision’), decision of 9 April 2002 ‑ XI ZR 
91/99 (München), NJW 2002, 1881‑1884. 
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assumed44 to restrict contradicting ECJ case law as far as possible (ie 
to B2C relationships).45 The BGH decided in the above‑mentioned deci‑
sion46 in favour of a separated interpretation, stating that section 439 
paragraph I BGB is interpreted according to the reasoning in Weber/Putz 
exclusively in B2C relationships.
6. Conclusion
As mentioned above, the decision has been criticised for its methodo‑
logical approach.47 From a consumer protection perspective, it is doubtful 
whether the proportionality principle – just as the seller’s duty to reim‑
burse removal and installation costs – will match the Directive’s objec‑
tive, as consumer protection ‘is known to be not for free’;48 the extended 
liability will rather be priced in by the seller: as far as he cannot pass on 
these costs to his supplier,49 he will eventually just raise the prices of his 
goods in order to cover the risk of paying for the removal or installation 
of potentially defective goods.
Against this background, the proportionality principle will be seen as 
an obstacle to keeping European contract law systems internally coher‑
ent rather than as a progressive step towards harmonised European pri‑
vate law. To prevent this unintended effect and further deviant ECJ case 
law in the future, the question should be asked whether it is not rather 
the European legislator that ought to regulate the very essential elements 
of contract law. The Weber/Putz proportionality principle is probably go‑
ing to be a lasting source of conflict – concerning a legal question where 
divergent approaches, which until Weber/Putz caused much less contro‑
versy than now, will eventually arise concerning the least harmful way 
of handling the proportionality principle. Further European jurisdiction 
following the attitude taken by the ECJ in Weber/Putz has the potential 
of endangering acceptance of the initiated path of harmonisation of Eu‑
ropean law via directives and should therefore be prevented by respective 
legislative measures by European institutions.
44 Lorenz (n 3) 2244.
45 S Lorenz, ‘Aus- und Wiedereinbaukosten bei der kaufrechtlichen Nacherfüllung zwi‑
schen Unternehmern – Zu den Grenzen „richtlinienorientierter“ Auslegung‘ (2013) NJW 
207‑209.
46 Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 17 October 2012, case number VIII ZR 226/11 (OLG 
Stuttgart), commented on by B Gsell, BGH: ‚Reichweite der richtlinienkonformen Auslegung 
beim Ersatz von Ausbaukosten von mangelhaften Liefergegenständen‘ in LMK (Lindenmai‑
er‑Möhring, Comments on the jurisdiction of the German Supreme Court)  2013, 343739.
47 Johnston and Unberath (n 4) 801.
48 Lorenz (n 3) 2243. Lorenz sees the decision as a product of ‘consumer romanticism’.
49 In this context, sections 478, 478 BGB, until now practically rather rarely applied, which 
grant the seller the right of regress against his supplier, will eventually become more signifi‑
cant.
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